Subsidiarity and the Impossibility of Virtue in the Hobbesian Political Order

In Leviathan, his famous work of political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes builds from his systematic account of man to an account of the origin and function of the Common-wealth. Hobbes lays out his idea of the state based upon two premises: that man is an individual, and that the state of nature is a state of constant war. Out of fear for their own preservation, people create the Common-wealth, which then assumes the responsibility for securing human relations and the needs of life. For the Leviathan to accomplish this end, the citizens contractually agree to divest themselves of their self-governance and hand responsibility over to the state. This raises a number of questions. Even if the Leviathan brings about an end to the state of war, what other consequences follow from this initial contract? Is Hobbes' political philosophy in alignment with the dignity of man as presented in Sacred Scripture? Ultimately, in presenting an individualist view of human nature and a fear-based political order, Hobbes conceptualizes a commonwealth inhospitable to virtue, since the sovereign usurps the opportunities for its practice.

Throughout Hobbes' account of man in the first section of Leviathan, he consistently treats man singly, sketching sense, imagination, knowledge, virtue, and discourse from man as an individual. As he moves into his account of the Common-wealth in Part II, this implicit premise forms a flawed foundation for the genesis of the state. He assumes that man by nature is an individual, rather than a person embedded from conception in a series of social structures and relationships. Self-reliance must be primary; all that man has to depend on are his own capabilities: "Every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men."[1] Man is set against "all other men," an antagonism that exacerbates the fear that pervades the state of nature.

Since the state of nature is a state of constant war, the individual's primary concern is self-preservation, and so he enters into a contract with others to form the state. Hobbes describes the contract as " a reall Unitie of them all . . . as if every man should say to every man, I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a Common-wealth."[2] The "finall Cause, End, or Designe of men" in binding themselves together in a Common-wealth is "the foresight of their own preservation . . . that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre."[3] Hobbes makes clear that only a Common-wealth can effectuate this. He deems family and friends insufficient, saying, "Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion."[4]Additionally, Hobbes places the origin of religion in man's anxiety about the future, making it a consequence of the state of nature, not a durable remedy.[5] In this line of argumentation, Hobbes disempowers family, friendship, and religious associations, reinforcing his own idea of man as an individual. The only relationship that ultimately matters for Hobbes' political order is that between the individual and the Common-wealth, the "Mortal God."[6] 

Leviathan presents a fear-based political order where violence and physical coercion to some degree surround all social interactions. While Hobbes makes a qualification for the situations the law does not address, such situations are still occurring within the framework of the Common-wealth. Because they are taking place in the Common-wealth and not in the state of nature, they are still indirectly supported by fear and the coercive power of the state. The sovereign is absolute, having aggregated power to himself (through the people's contract) in the name of peace and the preservation of his subjects. The state becomes the third party to associations between individuals, an arrangement mutually enforced by both the state and the citizens. The citizens' contractual agreement forms the state, and the state's power secures the citizens' other contracts, which "without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."[7]

The omnipresence of the Common-wealth and the power of the sovereign leave a citizenry near-incapable of practicing virtue simply because there are no chances to do so. The state is present to guarantee interpersonal associations by the power of the sword; therefore, neither party need concern themselves with justice. The state is present to secure food and other necessities of as part of his duty to preserve the lives of his subjects; therefore, the citizens do not need to exercise prudence in planning for the future, temperance in their use of earthly goods, or generosity in providing for another's need. Citizens absolve themselves of such responsibility in handing over governance to the sovereign and "[authorizing] all his Actions."[8] Hobbes even goes so far as to say that those unable to support themselves by their own labor "ought not be left to the Charity of private persons," but instead should be supported by the Common-wealth.[9]

Hobbes' conception of the political order flies in the face of the presentation of man in Sacred Scripture. The human person is made in the image and likeness of God, commanded to subdue and rule over the earth.[10] Aquinas views God's entrustment of the world to humanity as an expression of "the abundance of His goodness," because then "the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures."[11] The human person is capable of virtue because of his rational freedom, but virtue is only formed in practice. By imparting the "dignity of causality" to man, God gives him the necessary opportunities to practice virtue. Hobbes minimizes these opportunities at every turn, since the sovereign is vested with the responsibilities that are virtue's catalyst, those of looking out for the good of others. Ultimately, the Leviathan is hostile to virtue because it is hostile to love. Since fear permeates the state of nature and serves as a motivation for the contract that creates the Common-wealth, that Common-wealth necessarily excludes love, which casts out fear.[12]

In presenting an individualist view of human nature and a fear-based political order, Hobbes conceptualizes a commonwealth inhospitable to virtue, since the sovereign usurps the opportunities for its practice. The fear for survival so prevalent in the state of war brings people to contractually form the state and vest it with their own power of self-governance. Consequently, what could have been opportunities to practice virtue now fall within the purview of the state. In contrast, the human person in a Biblical worldview is expressly called to cultivate his virtue through creative, self-directed action, since God has given him the "dignity of causation" within His providence.

[1] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1971), 224.

[2] Ibid., 227.

[3] Ibid., 223.

[4] Ibid., 224.

[5] Ibid., 169-70.

[6] Ibid., 227.

[7] Ibid., 223.

[8] Ibid., 227.

[9] Ibid., 387.

[10] Genesis 1:28 (DRA).

[11] Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, second and revised edition, trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: London, Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1920), New Advent, 2017, https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1022.htm, Ia Q. 22 A. 3.

[12] 1 John 4:18.