The Philosophia Perennis and Theology: Edith Stein’s Christian Philosophy

In this paper I will argue that in her work Finite and Eternal Being, Edith Stein denies the total autonomy of philosophy as a discourse and argues that the philosophia perennis must see revealed truth as the starting point, standard, and perfecter of its insights. For Stein, modern philosophy had asserted itself against theology as determinate of its own proceedings and in so doing had led down innumerable streams of thought and nihilistic difference. Distinguishing philosophy as a science which aims at knowing all of being within the realms of human reasons, Stein at once defines the territory of philosophy and its inherent weakness without revelation. Furthering Maritain’s interpretation of Aquinas, Stein argues that if the philosopher wishes to be faithful to understanding being then faith will compel him beyond what is naturally accessible. A truly Christian philosophy will not find itself continually bracketing revelation out of the picture, but rather where deficiencies in understanding arise answers from faith should be incorporated. This however does not reduce philosophy to theology but rather clarifies, purifies, and elevates philosophical discourse. By advancing the Christian understanding of philosophy against modern conceptions of a purely autonomous science, Stein is now ready to proceed to contemplate Being in its entirety. The rest of the work serves as a demonstration of the desirability of having revelation as the starting point, standard, and perfecter of philosophical discourse. What results is the immense task of achieving the perfectum opus rationis which would unify the whole of human reason and revelation. In what follows, I will outline the development of Stein's argument for a truly Christian philosophy. From this the rather bold assertion emerges that theology must be maintained as the master discourse upon which philosophy can then proceed.[1]

Stein begins her analysis with the wasteland of modern philosophical discourse. She argues that it is a definitive feature of modern thought to detach itself from tradition and center its inquiry on knowledge rather than upon being.[2] This divorce from revealed truth denied the synthesis which medieval discourse had achieved. Medieval philosophy saw revelation as the standard by which its discoveries could be measured. It was no great leap for Blessed Duns Scotus to outline the difference between real and formal distinction and then to apply it to the Trinity, in which the Father is formally distinct from the Son but not really distinct. Using this tool, Scotus proceeds to argue that the intellect and will are formally distinct but not really distinct because they cannot exist separate from each other in any way.[3] Because revelation was presumed to be true in all of the discourse of the medievals, their philosophy could rarely be seen entirely distinct from their theology. Further, if certain philosophical concepts were found to be particularly useful to theology then they could be assimilated into theology. Terms such as homoousios, transubstantiation, hypostasis were not received as pure theological language directly from revelation, but rather the actions of philosophical reflection on revelation and then definition of doctrine. Having cast aside theology, modern philosophy experienced a tower of Babel moment, which Stein argues led each to speak their own languages, no longer understanding each other.[4]

Here Stein introduces the concept of the philosophia perennis which she sees as the antithesis of modern philosophy. This way of philosophy is viewed by outsiders as the private affair of theological faculties and seminaries where it is taught as a rigid system of concepts and a lifeless legacy to be handed down. The appraisal is not entirely without merit, as the critiques of the manualist tradition in theology throughout the twentieth century have demonstrated.[5] Viewing both the deposit of faith and the Christian philosophy of the medievals as a given, a closed book which must be memorized led Christian philosophy to be ineffectual and lifeless. The revival of Thomistic thought which started in Aeterni Patris by Leo XIII produced many great fruits; however, much of neo-Thomism did not read Thomas in conversation with Scripture, the Fathers, and other Medievals, but rather as the divinely appointed philosophical master which would rival the Kantians, Cartesian rationalists, and Enlightenment thinkers. Stein rejects this reading, and while praising the revival of Thomistic thought sees in it a living structure which can live in modern discourse in profound and exciting ways. While Thomistic thought was being revived, Stein argues that modern philosophy found that it could no longer proceed down Kantian paths. Different versions of Neo-Kantianism ultimately fell away for a return to ontology, which found its expression in the works of Husserl and Scheler on the philosophy of essence, followed by Heidegger’s philosophy of existence.[6] Moving from the interminable debates over foundations of knowledge and disillusioned with Kant, the return to the primary experience of being as such prepared a discourse ripe for return to the philosophia perennis. Here Stein hopefully asks, “Can the philosophy of the Middle Ages, now born again, and the philosophy of the 20th century, also born anew, flow together into the single riverbed of the philosophia perennis?”[7] With this exciting prospect, Stein says that they still remain speaking dissonant langues but that it may be possible to find a language in which they could understand each other. Acknowledging her home in the school of Edmund Husserel and her mother tongue being the one of the great phenomenologists, Stein says that she must “find her way into the great cathedral of scholasticism.”[8]

However, Stein argues that there is a greater difficulty than that of language, namely how knowledge is related to faith and philosophy to theology. This debate is played out even amongst Catholic thinkers and is determined by whether philosophy is seen as a purely natural science from its sources of natural experience and reason or whether it may draw material from revelation. Stein argues that Thomas asserts that there can be a philosophy based on pure natural reason without recourse to revealed truth, which she believes is best demonstrated by the Summa contra gentiles. Thomas asserts that when arguing with pagans and Muslims from whom revelation is not taken as a given, then appeals to natural reason must be made. There can be a common method and a common sphere of activity of which a total assent to the whole of revelation is not immediately necessary. Natural knowledge and faith for Thomas are not to be viewed therefore as purely separate realms, but rather as ways to the truth which is the whole. For the Summa contra gentiles, the express purpose is to manifest the truth of the Catholic faith. This may be the point where the greatest precision is needed, so as to not be equivocating. A first read of this section of Stein’s work may be seen as in contradiction with her outlook of a Christian philosophy. If there is this neutral realm of reason, then incorporating theology would seem unnecessary. However, no such neutral realm exists. What Thomas is asserting is the common method of reason, but not the autonomy of reason from faith.[9]

It is only the modern project of philosophy which seeks to detach itself from what it deems revelatory assumptions and to ground its discourse on what it finds as certain from reason alone. However, the work of the postmoderns has shown that no neutral starting point of knowledge from reason alone can be demonstrated. What results is the assertion of a starting point as a given, a movement of faith ironically, upon which the discourse is built. The spectre of nihilism arises as the final movement of reason left to its own devices. As Catherine Pickstock has argued, only nothingness can perfectly fulfill the conditions for a pure objectivity.[10] If the commonsense recognition of the depth of reality is not paired with a theological assumption of the world as gift, then the depth will be seen as an abyss rather than revealing the immensity of eternal being.[11] Because reason alone cannot ground the purely rational disclosure of being, only disclosure by faith remains possible. Revelation must remain as master discourse upon which philosophy can then begin its methodology in order to avoid a free-fall into nihilism.

Having established Thomas’ method of a Christian philosophy as a way rather than an autonomous realm, Stein discusses Jacques Maritain’s distinction between the nature and state of philosophy. For Maritain, the nature of philosophy is independent of faith and theology but that nature is embodied in specific historical circumstances, and it is some of those embodiments that we may find a Christian state of philosophy. Stein then considers philosophy as a science and observes that true being is the object which all science aims at. For philosophy then whatever is accessible to the natural powers of the human mind belongs to the domain of philosophical science. It is up to philosophy as well to determine the foundations and limits of other sciences. Finally, philosophy aims at ultimate clarity and reaching to the depths of being as such, of which metaphysics takes primacy in philosophy. Having explained what is meant by philosophy, Stein argues that a Christian state of philosophy is one in which grace has purified and strengthened the human mind as well as enriched philosophy with notions that it could have discovered on its own but is more readily available through revelation. However, faith also introduces to the philosopher that his goal cannot be reached without what is made known through revelation, which surpasses human foundations. Stein says that “faith and theology tell us about things that our natural reason could not attain by itself: about what natural reason has apprehended as the first being and at the same time about how all being is related to the first being”.[12] Reason would thus become unreasonable if it insisted on only believing what it could discover by its own methods. From this Maritain argues that morality cannot be completed as pure philosophy but must realize its total dependence on theology. It is only within the light of the Fall, redemption, and age of grace in the Church that a robust and coherent moral system could be composed. Here Stein says that “philosophy needs to be supplemented from theology, yet without becoming theology.”[13] Revealed truth remains the standard by which the philosopher must subordinate his findings.

Here Stein makes the bold assertion that philosophy in any of its states will depend upon faith and theology for the external conditions of its development.[14] There remains no neutral, pure, and autonomous philosophy, but rather the fruitful cooperation and mutual discourse of reason and faith, of philosophy and theology. We then must acknowledge the formal primacy of theology in the sense that both theology and philosophical conclusions belong to theology as such, in the loftiest sense of theology as the revelation of God through the Church.[15] A Christian philosophy can bring about a unifying of the whole of what natural reason and revelation makes accessible and can realize the ideal of a perfectum opus rationis. This ideal is found in the great summae of the Middle Ages which aimed at grasping the whole. However, a complete grasping of the whole will never be achieved in this life and the pursuit of philosophy should lead to contemplation of the divine.

Reaching the end of this prelude on the relation of philosophy to theology, one is struck by the clarity which she has regarding the failed modern project of philosophy, the hopefulness which she has for a return to the philosophia perennis through modern movements in experiential ontology, and finally the deeply theological view which she has on the role of philosophy. Denying the pure autonomy of reason and philosophy has not left her philosophy void of any credibility but rather aligned herself with the great masters of the medieval ages and allowed her to reach depths of profundity regarding being completely unattainable by reason alone. Her insights demand from Catholic philosophers a recognition of their utter dependence on theology and the faith, but at the same time an ennobling and hopeful prospect of bringing about a synthesis unifying the whole of reason and revelation.

Endnotes

1. Here I am indebted to the work of the theologian John Milbank and especially Theology and Social Theory. Further, his essay on Knowledge: The Theological critique of Philosophy in Hamman and Jacobi. I believe that this thesis represents the breakthrough that allows first a thorough critique of the modern positivists, a response to the postmodern deconstructionists, and finally the possibility of a robust Christian counter-discourse. If Theology is maintained as necessary meta-discourse then there are no realms untouched by the subject's fundamental assumptions of reality. Here one recognizes the fundamental insight of Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil of philosophy as “the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir”. The critique of modern philosophy present here in Stein is brought to its completion in the works of the French Post-Nietzscheans especially Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze. The Enlightenment project of creating realms of autonomous, pure reason apart from theological assumptions has been demonstrated to be absurd. A re-reigiousizing of the secular has taken place in the work of the postmoderns and to my mind represents a unique moment to reassert the Christian narrative as all encompassing. More work needs to be done to connect especially Thomas Kuhn’s work on paradigm and its relation to science and Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on tradition as predetermining philosophical conclusions. What they seem to be pointing to is that there can be no neutral and secular discourse in practice. Only a discourse which allows the truths of revelation to permeate its insights and inform its methods can be robustly called Christian.

2. All of the paper’s argument from Stein is found in her work Finite and Eternal Being from pages 36-50 in the translation by Walter Redmond.

3. See The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus.

4. Finite and Eternal Being, 38.

5. The critiques are too numerous to list. One may point to the overturning of every prepared document at the Second Vatican Council as distaste for the manualist tradition. In opposite ways, both Roberto De Mattei and John W. O’Malley in their works The Second Vatican Council: An Unwritten Story and Vatican I: The Council and the Making of the Ultramontane Church respectively show the errors of a misunderstood manualism and Neo-Thomism that called forth such a large response from the Nouvelle Theologie theologians present at Vatican II.

6. Finite and Eternal Being, 38.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Finite and Eternal Being, 42.

10. See After Writing: The Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy, Chapter 3.

11. See Knowledge: The Theological critique of Philosophy in Hamman and Jacobi by John Milbank.

12. Finite and Eternal Being, 48.

13. Ibid.

14. Finite and Eternal Being, 49.

15. Ibid.

Bibliography

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MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

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